Patients have a right to expect that their personal information will remain confi dential when they consult a practitioner. However, when they consult a doctor who is contracted to provide services as part of a business, the question can arise as to the right to ownership of the medical records created by that doctor, and/or the information recorded therein, after that doctor leaves the business. This was the issue in a recent case heard in NSW, IVF Australia Pty Ltd v Palantrou Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 810, in which IVFA sought an injunction to prevent specialists from accessing a database containing patient information when those specialists left the business to set up elsewhere. A further issue is what effect privacy legislation has on such disputes. This review provides an overview of the case and its outcome.
Introduction
The promulgation of recent legislation in New South Wales has strengthened the right of individuals to privacy and confidentiality of personal records held by institutions in both public and private domains. However, when patient records are created as part of business, the question of the ownership of information which had been added to a database was the issue raised in a recent case, IVF Australia Pty Ltd v Palantrou Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 810 in the Supreme Court of NSW. The question can arise when a medical practice is sold and/or when a doctor, employed/ contracted by a practice with a patient load, leaves that practice to join another practice or set up as a sole practitioner.
The facts
The plaintiff, IVF Australia Ltd. (IVFA), who conducted a business providing medical services for in vitro fertilisation, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from using databases involving records of patients who had sought treatment with the plaintiff's businesses. An interlocutory injunction is an immediate remedy to cause another party to abstain from Professional practice and innovation provided a receipt in the name of the specialist. With respect to other services, the patient paid the plaintiff, or a doctor who was rostered to do a particular procedure on the day of an appointment.
The agreement was to last for five years initially, subject to specified termination, and the specialists agreed inter alia, not to directly or indirectly refer patients to any other medical provider for six months following termination. The relationship of the parties was referred to that of principal and consultant. A confidentiality clause prohibited the consultants from divulging to third parties or making use of any confidential clinical, scientific and commercial information that is the intellectual property of the plaintiff outside of the performance of their duties, without the express prior written agreement of the plaintiff.
Some of the consultants established a new clinic, the defendant Company. The plaintiff sent Dr T and other doctors a letter terminating the agreement they had with the plaintiff, reserving the right to claim damages for past breaches of their letter of agreement, and barring their access to the plaintiff's consulting rooms.
The case
To implement the arrangements specified in the agreement with the medical specialists who had signed letters, the plaintiff established a database; a question before the court was whether the plaintiff owned the information stored in the database. According to the Court: Some of that information would seem to be the property of the plaintiff. Some of it may be confidential, though it is hard to see what, as even the name and address of the patient may not be confidential information. And certainly it would not be confidential information of the plaintiff, in the case where a general practitioner referred one of the patients to a particular specialist, nor would the past history of appointments. However, the subset of profiles, which appears to be the treatment of the particular patient and the various tests that she or he had been administered, may or may not come into this area.
The Court determined the outcome of the case by analysing the contractual relations between the parties and the factual context. The defendants argued that the proper analysis of the agreement was that they retained the plaintiff to do the administrative work to keep records for them and that by implication, the information was their property. At this point the Court referred to two relevant precedents that were contrary to the defendant's argument. In Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, the High Court stated that, as a general rule, documents brought into existence by an agent while in the employ of a principal belong to the principal and not to the agent. Mrs Breen was denied access to her medical records for the purpose of litigation in the United States, because the Court held that they were the property of a private practitioner and he was not prepared to release them unless she signed a waiver providing him with immunity from litigation. In another case, heard in the NSW Court of Appeal, Health Services for Men v D'Souza (2000) 48 NSWLR 448, the medical records written by doctors contracted to provide a service to clinic patients were held to be the property of the clinic and not to the individual doctors.
A further argument of the defendants was that they had a licence to use the information they entered into the database. According to the Court, there was no doubt that the plaintiff has copyright in the compilation of the database and that it is the plaintiffs' property, subject to a licence to use. The defendants further argued that they were merely using the information they had originally gleaned from the plaintiff's compilation and not the compilation itself. The Court did not favour the defendant's argument that they acquired the right to use information collected by them under licence other than when they were acting as consultants under the letter agreement.
One of the defendants downloaded the plaintiff's database into his own equipment. Although he handed over three CDs to the plaintiff's solicitors, the Court was of the view that he retained much of the material in one form or another. He admitted using the information in the database to inform patients of his change of address, telephone some patients to reschedule appointments and inform referring doctors of his change of address. Given that the event had already occurred (i.e. 'the horse had bolted'), the way to deal with that particular matter was said to be by Professional practice and innovation a claim for damages rather than by way of injunction.
It was not contested that the defendant doctors may have relevant details of patients whom they had seen in consultations. In such cases, the Court was of the view that there was no prejudice to members of the public where the defendant doctors may have relevant details of patients who may have attended any of them at an initial consultation or follow-up appointment. However, with respect to those patients who had been 'processed' by the rostered doctor and that doctor happened to be a defendant to the proceedings, the Court was of the view that it was not appropriate for the defendants to have that information unless the patient concerned consents.
With respect to the application of privacy laws, the Court held that the NSW Health Records and Information Privacy Act 1 did not give a right to a civil action, and that the Commonwealth Privacy Act 2 does not give an automatic right of action in the state courts.
Outcome
In order to be granted an interlocutory injunction the plaintiff has to establish that there is a strongly arguable case, the balance of convenience favours the grant rather than its refusal and damages are not an adequate remedy. In this case, Young CJ, using the standard test for issuing injunctions, was of the opinion that 'on the balance of probabilities the plaintiff had just got over the barrier of showing an arguable case'. In balancing fairness and justice between the parties, His Honour believed there should be some limitation on the defendants but was not prepared to go as far as the plaintiffs wanted. He came down to ordering that the defendants were not to make use of any of the material they had abstracted from the plaintiff's database for any statistical or research purposes other than with the written consent of the plaintiff.
In the course of the judgment, the judge expressed his opinion that the appointment of a referee to arbitrate or mediate in any dispute, as to whose patient each person was, is a sensible
